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The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting:
Why the Hastert Rule Leads to Defeat
Jesse Richman, Old Dominion University
This study demonstrates that unconditional blocking of bills opposed by a majority of the majority party—as implied
by the party cartel model and advocated by former Speaker Dennis Hastert—can produce conditions in which the ma-
jority party loses popular support and loses elections. The theoretical analysis and empirical results imply that the use
of negative agenda power to block bills is circumscribed by this risk of electoral defeat. As a result, the opportunity for
effective negative agenda control is conditional on majority party issue advantage, party polarization, and the distribu-
tion of status quo locations. In particular, majority party roll rates should sometimes be nonzero, blocking increases the
odds of majority party defeat in House of Representatives elections, and policy change is most likely on issues with status
quo that the model suggests are the riskiest to block.
To block or not to block? In 2003 Republican HouseSpeaker Dennis Hastert asserted that “the job of theSpeaker is not to expedite legislation that runs counter
to the wishes of the majority of his majority” (Babington
2004). In 2013, Hastert’s successor, John Boehner, funda-
mentally disagreed, arguing that he should determine “Where’s
the ground that we fight on? Where’s the ground that we re-
treat on? Where are the smart fights? Where are the dumb
fights that we have to stay away from?” (Easley 2013, 2).
Boehner believed his willingness to allow passage of bills
opposed by his copartisans would contribute to his party’s
subsequent electoral victories by neutralizing electorally dan-
gerous issues.
In their seminal work Setting the Agenda, Cox and Mc-
Cubbins (2005) largely sided with Hastert: “No dimension j
on which the status quo (SQj) is preferred to the floor me-
dian (Fj) by a majority of the majority party is ever sched-
uled for floor consideration” (42). Majority party leaders
use agenda power to prevent their party from experiencing a
“roll” in which a majority of the party opposes legislation
that is nevertheless voted on and passed. The only point at
which Cox and McCubbins softened their argument for un-
conditional blocking was in chapter 6 of their book, where
they added an exogenous cost. After briefly making the
point that some issues are too costly to block, they left the
issue of public pressure or other sources of blocking costs
mostly unexplored. This study fills that gap by endogeniz-
ing blocking’s electoral costs.
I extend the literature on the policy costs of blocking for
majority party moderates (Jenkins and Monroe 2012) to in-
clude electoral costs for the majority party. Jenkins and Mon-
roe (2012) provided evidence that the policy losses borne by
moderate majority party legislators are substantial enough
that they must be compensated for. My analysis takes the
exploration of blocking’s costs into the electoral arena.
Blocking carries electoral costs when it gives moderate
voters strategic incentives to defeat a majority party repre-
sentative they are ideologically aligned with. As noted by
Buchler (2011), Grofman (1985), and Peress (2008) in other
contexts, incremental or gridlocked policy making can cre-
ate incentives for strategic non–proximity voting in elections.
Critically, I show that when consideration of relatively ex-
treme status quos is blocked by the incumbent majority
party, moderate voters may gain by strategically voting into
power what had been the minority party. For moderate ma-
jority party sympathizers, changing party control may be the
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only way to move an extreme status quo blocked by the
majority party back to the center.
I provide evidence that policy losses that blocking creates
for moderates generate electoral risks to which the majority
party may have to respond. Because a loss of majority con-
trol often means major policy and perquisite losses for the
incumbent majority party, majority party leaders may mod-
erate blocking in order to avoid electoral defeat. However,
there are also equilibrium conditions in which blocking leads
to loss of majority status, and I explore empirical evidence
linking blocking to electoral defeat in US House elections.
This study connects the analysis of negative agenda con-
trol—blocking—with the broader body of research exam-
ining conditions for the exercise of particular partisan pow-
ers. As with work by Carson et al. (2010) and Lebo, McGlynn,
and Koger (2007), I argue that the exercise of party influence
can harm the electoral prospects of majority party legisla-
tors, which can constrain the use of party power, and I show
that these constraints are in part mediated by the charac-
teristics of the opposition party. As with the literature on
conditional party government (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and
Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991), I identify conditions for the ex-
ercise of majority party power that are only sometimes met.
This study also contributes to a growing literature examin-
ing influences on the congressional agenda. In some respects,
this study’s focus on the electoral costs of blocking provides a
negative agenda parallel to the argument made by Harbridge
(2015) that “the need to establish a record of legislative suc-
cess, including the passage of legislation into law, constrains
partisan agenda-setting” (51). There are also important in-
tersections with Adler and Wilkerson’s (2012) emphasis on
electoral accountability for problem solving in Congress:
this study is about the electoral consequences of failing to
address problems. As with work by Butler and Powell (2014),
I examine contexts in which voters punish their legislator
for actions by the party, although the specific scenario (party
blocks popular legislative change) is not one they studied.
The first two sections of the article analyze a multi-period
party cartel model in which the threat of electoral loss leads
the majority party to strategically balance policy and elec-
toral considerations when setting the agenda, and identify
the empirical implications of the model. The next two sec-
tions examine empirical evidence for key model predictions:
that blocking is associated with electoral losses and that more
electorally risky status quos are more likely to be moved to-
ward the chamber median.
THE MODEL
I begin with the standard unidimensional spatial model of the
legislature. Single-peaked legislator ideal points for each issue j
are distributed along a dimension. Let Fj be the chamber me-
dian, while mj is the minority party median and Mj is the
majority party median. Without loss of generality I assume
mj ! Fj !Mj. In line with the negative agenda control model
of Cox and McCubbins (2005), legislation dealing with each
issue j is considered in the following manner during each
legislative session. Each issue starts session t with an initial
status quo (qjt) and the majority party median then decides
whether to allow legislation to reach the floor concerning that
issue. Each issue that is considered by the floor will have the
outcome decided by puremajority rule, producing a billBj that
passes the legislature at the preference of the chamber me-
dian (Bjp Fj), establishing a new status quo qjt11 with which
play begins in period t 1 1. Each legislator, including m, F,
and M derives utility from policy choices using a symmetric
utility function with a single peak at the legislator’s ideal point
on the issue dimension.
Instead of ending play after a single period, as in the clas-
sic party cartel model of Cox and McCubbins (2005), I con-
sider a second legislative session following an election. Vot-
ers have outcome-based utility functions that are symmetric
and single-peaked on each issue. In the election, the median
voter in each district selects between minority party (ci) and
majority party (Ci) candidates. Candidate policy ideal points
on all issues meet the assumption that cij ! Cij based upon
an evaluation of expected utility in session 2, with the dis-
tance Cij 2 cij p P ≥ 0 set as a constant degree of party
issue polarization for all districts. The key polarization in
the model is in the district of the chamber median legisla-
tor.1 I define majority party issue advantage “aj” as equal to
cij2 vij



2 Cij2 vij



 or alternately P2 2 Cij2 vij



. By as-
sumption aj ≥ 0 because if aj ! 0, then even simple proxim-
ity models predict majority party defeat, a case that is not
the focus of this model. Thus, if the majority is defeated,
the chamber median will shift from Fj to fj p Fj 2 P, a dis-
tance aj farther away from the median voter.
After the election, the party with a majority of the seats
in the legislature organizes the chamber and decides whether
to permit consideration of bills that would alter each status
quo as discussed above. At the end of this second session of
the legislature, the game ends.
I first solve the game for a single representative issue and
then extend the results to multiple issues. The solution is by
backward induction, beginning with the final period of play.
I begin by noting that voters can anticipate the policy con-
1. The assumption of constant polarization across districts simplifies
modeling by ruling out substantively unimportant problems such as a change
in the identity of the chamber median district after a change of party control.
Variation in polarization across issues is explored below.
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sequences of giving each party control in the second period
to be the result of standard cartel agenda setting.
Definition 1. The blockout zone is the region of the
issue space in which the majority party median pre-
fers the status quo to the outcome of a majority rule
decision.
If M is the majority party, all issues in [Fj, Fj 1
2(Mj 2 Fj)] are in the blockout zone.
If m (the initial minority) becomes the majority
party, all issues in [ fj, fj 2 2( fj 2 mj)] are in the
blockout zone.
Claim 1. In the final period, all issues in the majority
party blockout zone will be blocked.
Proof. In the final session the majority party will block
all issues because this is the last period of play. Cox
and McCubbins (2005) have shown that consideration
of issue j if and only if the majority party median (Mj)
prefers the policies of the floor median (Fj) to the sta-
tus quo (qjt) maximizes utility for the majority party
median.
Electoral decisions depend upon expectations about pol-
icy outcomes in the final session. If the status quo is outside
the blockout zone, the voter in the median district vfj will
prefer that the majority party (M) retain control and will
prefer to elect Fj so long as that majority party is more
proximate to the voter (aj 1 0). However, if the issue status
quo is inside the blockout zone, whether the voter prefers
that the minority party gain control of the chamber depends
upon how close the minority party candidate fj is to vfj as
analyzed below.
Claim 2. Defeat condition. For status quo in the block-
out zone, if vfj2 fj



< qj2 vfj



, then themedian district
median voter will prefer the minority candidate.
Proof. If the minority wins control of the chamber,
then fj will become the new chamber median. If and
only if the utility expected to arise from shifting the
status quo to fj is greater than the utility of the cur-
rent status quo will the voter choose to elect the mi-
nority party candidate. From claim 1, the outcome of
M retaining the majority is qjt. Because utility is single-
peaked and symmetric, if the distance from the pivotal
voter (vfj ) to fj is less than the distance from the pivotal
voter to qjt, then the utility of a party switch is greater
than the utility of retaining the current incumbent
majority party.
Figure 1 illustrates an instance in which the median voter
of the chamber median district prefers to change party con-
trol. The blocked status quo (q) is farther from the district
median voter in the district than the minority party candi-
date. Because the policy outcome that results from selecting
the minority ( f ) is closer to V than the policy outcome as-
sociated with selecting the majority candidate (q), V is best
off voting for the minority candidate.
Claim 3. Loss of majority control if defeat condition is
satisfied. For status quo in the blockout zone that
satisfies the condition for defeat of the majority (M)
in the median district ( vfj2 fj



< qj2 vfj



), the equiv-
alent defeat condition will hold for all majority party
districts with Mij< Fj : vij2 fj



< qj2 vij



, and M will
lose majority status.
Proof. The distance qj2 vij



 is strictly greater than
qj2 vfj



 for vij ! vfj because when the defeat condition
holds, qj 1 Fj. Similarly, the quantity vij2 fj



 will be
smaller than vfj2 fj



 if vij 1 fj (and if vi ! fj, then vi
will always be better off with fj than Fj when qj 1 Fj).
Consequently, if the defeat condition for issue j is sat-
isfied for the median district, the incumbent major-
ity party (M) will be defeated in enough seats that it
will become the minority party after the election and
fj will become the new chamber median.
If the median district prefers to change party control, all
incumbent party candidates positioned below the chamber
median will be defeated as well, leading to a change in ma-
jority control. Such districts will be better off electing mi-
nority party representatives because the utility expected to
arise from shifting the status quo to fj is greater than the util-
ity of the current status quo for all such districts if the con-
dition specified in claim 3 is satisfied.
The final step in solving the model is to examine the ini-
tial legislative period. If blocking gives voters an incentive
Figure 1. Example of majority party defeat condition
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to defeat the majority party, then party leaders can forestall
such defeat by relaxing negative agenda control. Claim 4 de-
velops the conditions under which the majority party allows
such reduction in blocking to occur based upon party lead-
ers’ expectations concerning electoral consequences.2 Block-
ing can be reduced by allowing the majority to be rolled or
the response could be more subtle, embedded in compro-
mise or omnibus legislation.
Claim 4. The following summarizes conditions for
blocking, rolls, and incumbent majority election victory:
(1) If qj< Fj or qj > Fj1 2(M2 Fj), then no blocking
needed, majority victory.
Otherwise (if status quo is in blockout zone):
(2) If vfj2 fj



 > qj2 vfj



, then blocking, majority
victory.
(3) If vfj2 fj



< qj2vfj



 and 2UM(Fj)>UM(qj)1UM( fj),
then no blocking, majority victory.
(4) If vfj2 fj



< qj2 vfj



and 2UM(Fj)<UM(qj)1UM( fj),
then blocking, majority defeat.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 follow directly from claim 1 and
claim 2. Parts 3 and 4: Suppose that in session 1,
there is a representative issue with a status quo qj
in the blockout zone, such that the defeat condition
vfj2 fj



 ! qj2 vfj



 is expected to hold true in the
election and party control will therefore switch. For
the majority party median, the policy utility across
periods of allowing a roll is 2UM(Fj)—policy will be
located at the preference of the chamber median in
both periods—while the utility of blocking is UM(q j)1
UM( fj). Since UM(q j) 1 UM(Fj) ≥ UM( fj), allowing a
roll makes the majority party worse off in period 1
but better off in period 2. Therefore, the decision
whether to allow a roll or to block and accept electoral
defeat will depend upon the relative payoffs. If 2UM
(Fj) 1 UM(q j) 1 UM( fj), then the incumbent majority
party benefits from permitting a roll.
Figures 2A and 2B illustrate the range of best responses
by the majority party as a function of status quo locations
(horizontal axis) and the degree of majority party advan-
tage (fig. 2A) and party polarization (2B) for issues within
the blockout zone (assuming linear utility functions). If the
majority party issue advantage exceeds the policy costs of
blocking (2A), then the district median voter has no better
alternative to the (blocked) status quo, so the majority party
can block and win. When the majority party must choose
between accepting defeat and allowing a roll (i.e., majority
advantage is not sufficiently strong), polarization becomes
important (fig. 2B). Here the majority trades off the im-
mediate policy losses associated with relaxing agenda con-
trol with the long-term policy losses associated with electoral
defeat. In the short term, blocking preserves valued status
quo locations. In the longer term (if the defeat condition is
satisfied), blocking puts those locations at risk for more sub-
stantial change. If polarization is high enough, the major-
ity always prefers permitting a roll, because this avoids the
larger policy costs that arise from loss of majority status.3 In
the model, blocking leads to loss of majority status when the
policy cost of not blocking is greater than the policy cost of
losing majority status.
The analysis above is for a representative issue. Exten-
sion to multiple issues raises some intriguing additional im-
plications. Although the defeat condition remains a situa-
tion in which the median district median voter derives higher
utility under a change of party control, with multiple issues
the location of any one issue status quo becomes less im-
portant. In the multiple issue model, the majority party can
safely block some issues that would (if the only issue) lead
to its defeat, provided that in the aggregate the median voter
in the median district still prefers majority control to mi-
nority control.
Claim 5. If Uvf ( f ) 1 Uvf (qt11), the majority party
will be defeated.
Proof. Define qt11 as the outcomes across issues re-
sulting from the first period, with some issues retained
at the status quo and others moved to issue-chamber
median Fj. Define Uvf ( f ) as the utility of the median
district across all issues from a change in party con-
trol. Claim 1 implies that f and qt11 are the expected
outcomes of the second period if m and M, respec-
tively, hold a majority in the chamber. Therefore, the
median voter of the median district should support M
orm conditional on the preference between f and qt11.
Corollary 1. The majority party may permit con-
sideration of some but not all blocked issues and ex-
2. Clearly such electoral expectations may at times be wrong, leading
to unnecessary relaxation of agenda control and/or electorally dangerous
blocking. In addition, party leaders might behave in ways contrary to this
model if some unmodeled factor (e.g., threat of primary defeat) caused
them to alter their behavior.
3. Absent intradistrict party polarization (P p a p 0), the ideology
of the chamber median will not change with a switch in party control
( fj p Fj). In this extreme case, the majority will always block because
UM(Fj) 1 UM(qj) and always be defeated because 0j j< qj2 vfjj j.
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treme blockout zone status quos are the most likely to
be considered.
Discussion: To maintain majority status, the majority
must achieve the victory condition Uvf ( f ) ≤ Uvf (qt11). If
the defeat condition of claim 5 is satisfied, then to change
this to a majority victory condition, the majority party will
need to allow consideration of at least one issue. Consider
the example in figure 3. Two issue status quos, qj and qi,
are located within the majority party blockout zone. Be-
cause the median district median voter is better off when
the more extreme qj is addressed, there are a range of defeat
conditions that can be turned into victory conditions by al-
lowing consideration of qj but not qi. As a bonus for the
majority, moving extreme status quo (qj) leads to fewer mem-
bers being rolled and to smaller utility losses for the major-
ity median.4
Corollary 2. When the majority party permits con-
sideration of some but not all blocked issues, issues
with a smaller majority party issue advantage (a) are
more likely to be considered.
Discussion: Suppose that majority party issue advantage
(a) is high for one issue and low for another, but that the
issue status quo has the identical position relative to major-
ity party members’ preferences, and hence the same location
in the blockout zone. The policy costs of unblocking both
issues are the same for the majority, but the issue with the
smaller aj is more electorally dangerous because the median
voter suffers a smaller policy loss from a change in party con-
trol. Hence, there exists a set of defeat conditions that can be
turned into victory conditions by allowing consideration of
the low majority advantage issue but not by allowing con-
sideration of the high advantage issue.
Simulated policy consequences
Conditions in which the majority party will choose to relax
negative agenda control (or will suffer electoral defeat) are
quite likely to arise in a party cartel model, and they limit
majority policy gains over time. Simulations provide a useful
means to contrast the policy outcomes of the classic party
cartel model with those under the equilibrium analyzed
above.
Figure 3. Majority choice of issues for party roll
Figure 2. A, majority party defeat condition; B, majority strategy in session 1 when defeat condition is satisfied
4. Salience of issues is relevant in two circumstances. Some issues may
be so salient to voters that the only way the majority party can change a
defeat condition to a victory condition is by relaxing negative agenda con-
trol on that particular issue. If some issues weigh more heavily in the utility
calculations of voters than they do in the utility calculations of legislators,
these “salient for voters” issues will unblocked more often.
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In the simulations reported in figure 4, I fix the location
of the majority party median and the floor median (0.5 for
floor median and 0.75 for party median). The initial dis-
tribution of status quo locations is uniform, with all issues
on the minority party side. To highlight the key role of
blocked status quo, I tilt this election in favor of the major-
ity party by assuming that each majority party legislator Ci
serving in session 1 was elected by a district i with a median
voter (vi) who exactly shares the preferences of the legis-
lator (Ci p vi). This is a polar case with initial conditions
most advantageous to the electoral interests of the majority.
If a policy issue status quo is considered, the chamber me-
dian prevails (F at 0.5 under initial majority party control).
Subsequent random shocks (ϵjt normally distributed with
mean zero) shift status quo locations between sessions, as sug-
gested by Cox and McCubbins (2005, 41).5 Hence, qj, t11p
F1 ϵjt if the status quo is not blocked, and qj, t11p qj, t1 ϵjt
if the status quo is blocked.
The solid line in figure 4 reflects a situation in which all
issues in the “blockout zone” are blocked in accord with the
Hastert rule (and by assumption the majority party is never
defeated). The dashed line reflects two-period equilibrium
play in the model developed above with polarization and ma-
jority issue advantage both equal to the distance between the
majority party median and the chamber median (0.25).
Here the majority party responds strategically to the risk of
defeat. The dotted line reflects equilibrium play in the two-
period model with no polarization and no majority issue
advantage, a condition in which the majority party always
blocks and accepts defeat.
The policy consequences of introducing electoral costs
are readily apparent in figure 4. Under the Hastert rule with
no risk of defeat, the mean status quo location shifts con-
siderably further toward the majority median. This reflects
the repeated revision of status quo outside of the blockout
zone and the gradual random movement of status quo from
the floor median deeper into the blockout zone. However,
the ability of the majority party to shift status quo in its
favor is constrained by the risk of losing elections.
Alternative model assumptions
The analysis offered above differs dramatically from that
of Buchler (2011, 15), which presents a formal model sug-
gesting that “party agenda control can allow majority party
extremists to defeat more centrist minority party candidates.”
Buchler’s analysis implies that Hastert’s rule blocking in-
creases the incumbent majority party’s chances of winning
elections, but I show that blocking can undermine the ma-
jority’s chances. The key differences between our approaches
are (i) I allow for the possibility that the incumbent major-
ity party will lose majority status, while Buchler assumes
it is guaranteed to remain in control of the chamber,6 and
(ii) in my model, voters care about policy outcomes, whereas
in Buchler’s model, voters care about whether they agree
with their representative on realized roll call votes.7
A modicum of prospective voting, combined with the
possibility of majority defeat is sufficient for a counterex-
ample to Buchler’s analysis without abandoning the assump-
tion that voters care only about agreement on realized roll
call votes. Suppose that the status quos for all issues are
lodged far into the incumbent majority party’s blockout
zone. Since no issues will be acted upon, voters will not agree
with the incumbent on any votes. Prospectively, if the in-
cumbent majority party were defeated, such voters would
agree with their new representative on a positive number
of votes and—if all status quos were sufficiently extreme—
disagree on zero.
Figure 4. Simulated effect of negative agenda setting on mean SQ location
(50,000 issue runs, d p 0.05).
5. Shocks might reflect policy implementation, new information, or
the emergence of new issues. Biased shocks with mean ≠ 0 could either
speed up or delay this pattern. Larger shocks lead to more rapid con-
vergence but also lead to less extreme movement of the mean status quo
away from the chamber median. In fig. 4 the shock standard deviation is
1/10 the size of the blockout zone (0.05).
6. My model may be better at describing those instances in which the
majority party’s grip on power dramatically unravels as in the 1,994 2006
and 2010 US House elections.
7. There is some evidence that voters care about policy issues and
outcomes rather than simply about agreement on (past) roll call votes
(Abbe et al. 2003; Adler and Wilkerson 2012; Ansolabehere and Iyengar
1994; Brasher 2009), though more work is needed to fully test Buchler’s
assumptions.
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It is also possible that leaders do not care as much about
policy as my model assumes. Party leaders motivated by re-
taining the benefits of office (e.g., Cox and Magar 1999) as
well as policy will allow more rolls and accept fewer defeats.
A preference for perquisites shifts the boundaries between
parts 3 and 4 of claim 4. Priority on winning elections (rel-
ative to policy) increases willingness to accept policy losses
that forestall electoral losses.
Another concern might be whether voters can reason-
ably be expected to carry out the sophisticated strategic cal-
culations in the model. The key factor is that opposition cam-
paigns have a strong incentive to point out majority-blocked
issues because blocking creates a slate of issues about which
the public in swing districts agrees with the opposition can-
didate (and the opposition candidate’s party more generally)
about the direction of policy change desired. For instance,
when House Republican leadership blocked consideration
of the Senate version of the Violence Against Women Act,
it played directly into the “war on women” theme of con-
temporary Democratic campaigns.
Finally, the Cox and McCubbins’s (1993) model of par-
ties emphasizes the idea that parties nurture the value of their
electoral “brand” (see also Butler and Powell 2014). Hence,
one might argue that the majority party derives a positive
electoral benefit from blocking through concealing intra-
party factionalism. Let the brand benefits of blocking be
termed b. To integrate b into the model, add it to the util-
ity voters receive from voting for majority legislators if
blocking is maintained. Hence, the defeat condition becomes
vfj2 fj



 1 b ! qj2 vfj



 if and only if the majority has not
violated the Hastert rule. The region within which the ma-
jority party can block and win expands as a result. In addi-
tion, avoiding defeat through allowing a majority party roll
would become more uncommon. Aside from these shifts in
boundaries, however, the analysis would remain substan-
tively similar.
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of empirical implications of the model
including these: (i) blocking leads to majority party defeat,
(ii) roll rates will be nonzero, (iii) rolls are most likely for
relatively extreme blocked status quo, and (iv) roll rates will
be higher when party polarization is higher.
Blocking leads to majority party defeat
The key implication of the model, and one not tested in the
literature, is that blocking increases the likelihood of major-
ity party defeat. In claim 4, the only condition in which the
majority party is defeated is when it blocks consideration of
issues. Several specific implications follow: (i) the risk of de-
feat is higher when the blockout zone is larger because more
issues are likely to be blocked, (ii) the risk of defeat is higher
when more issues are blocked because there are more issues
for which a majority of voters can potentially benefit from a
change of party control, and (iii) the risk of defeat is higher
when the status quo location is closer to the majority party
median. The first and second implications follow from the
fact that blocking leads to defeat (claims 2 and 3), and the
third implication follows from the pattern shown in figure 2:
the probability that blocking will lead to majority party elec-
toral defeat, conditional on party polarization, increases as the
mean status quo location moves closer to the majority party
median. I test these predictions below.
Positive majority roll rates
The equilibrium results above amend the argument by Cox
and McCubbins (2005) that negative agenda control is con-
stant, with a majority-party roll rate of zero. In my multi-
period party cartel model, the majority party sometimes
chooses to relax negative agenda control for issues that are
too electorally dangerous. Thus, the majority party roll rate
will not always be zero.
No new empirical tests are offered here, but this does ac-
count for an empirical fact identified by Cox and McCubbins
(2005). Although low, the majority party roll rate in the
House of Representatives is often nonzero. This implication
is also consistent with the one of the conclusions that Cox
andMcCubbins (2005, chap. 6) reached when they examined
instances of majority party rolls: rolls often involved high sa-
lience and electorally risky issues.8
Several cases in which speakers have explicitly reflected
upon their strategic agenda control choices reinforce the no-
tion that blocking is sometimes abandoned in order to en-
hance electoral prospects. In his autobiography, former Dem-
ocratic speaker of the house Tip O’Neill recalled his reaction
to the legislative agenda pursued by Ronald Reagan in 1981.
“As Speaker, I could have refused to play ball with the Rea-
gan administration by holding up the president’s legislation
in the Rules Committee. But in my view, this wasn’t a po-
litically wise thing to do” (O’Neill and Novak 1987, 344).
O’Neill elaborates that he sacrificed agenda control in order
8. There are, of course, other reasons why party rolls might be allowed be-
yond the reasons articulated in this study. For instance, on occasion a measure
reaches thefloor througha discharge petition, although party pressure, concerns
about primary challenges, and/or a desire by members to preserve status quo
they would not vote for (VanHouweling 2001) appear to ensure that this is very
rare. Green (2010) argues that speakers sometimes bring up legislation to satisfy
their personal reelection concerns or to aid the “institutional presidency” despite
opposition by party members.
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to protect the Democratic majority. The majority was rolled
(Cox and McCubbins 2005, 257), but the majority survived.
Hastert’s majority-of-the-majority agenda setting fared little
better among his successors: Nancy Pelosi and John Boehner
both publically refused to endorse his policy, while opining
that the speaker should have more flexibility (Ota 2007; UPI
2010). Boehner actively broke the Hastert rule for a fiscal
cliff bill, disaster relief, and violence against women bills even
though the bills were opposed by a majority of the House
Republican Party. Although Boehner’s actions clearly and
intentionally violated what Cox and McCubbins (2005, 209)
term “the minimal fiduciary standard—debarring office-
holders from using their powers to roll the majority party,”
Boehner was reelected as speaker in both the 113th and
114th Congresses. Reelection despite violation of the Hastert
rule may reflect the strategic value of addressing electorally
dangerous issues, even for members who do not want to vote
for such bills.
Conditions for majority roll
Rolls will be most likely in specific circumstances. One key
circumstance is the presence of a relatively extreme blocked
status quo. As illustrated in figure 3, rolls should be most
likely for blockout zone status quos that are more extreme,
as blocking such status quos carries the largest electoral costs,
and allowing rolls on such status quos offers the largest elec-
toral benefits. I offer a preliminary test this implication below.
Party polarization also influences the likelihood of a roll,
as shown in figure 2B. As the majority party and minority
party become more polarized, the policy costs of a loss of
majority status increase. If the defeat condition is satisfied,
there is always a level of polarization below which the ma-
jority party will not allow a roll and above which the ma-
jority party will allow a roll (as illustrated in fig. 2B). Thus,
the majority party will allow more majority party rolls when
the parties are more polarized.9
No new empirical tests are offered here because Keith
Krehbiel (2007) has already found evidence for a positive re-
lationship between party polarization and the roll rate.
EMPIRICAL TESTS
All model results build on key implications concerning
the relationship between blocking and electoral defeat, so I
focus on testing these predictions. In particular I investigate
whether larger blockout zones, more blocked issues, and a
mean status quo location closer to the majority median are
associated with a heightened risk of majority electoral loss. I
also briefly investigate whether more extreme blockout zone
status quos are more likely to be revised toward the median.
Blocking and defeat
The dependent variable of majority defeat is measured as
a dichotomous measure of whether the majority became
the minority and as a continuous measure of the portion of
House seats won by the current majority party. Both mea-
sures are based on the election at the end of each Congress.
Party codes compiled by Poole and Rosenthal (2007) and
official election outcomes for recent sessions are the basis
of these variables. The 17th House of Representatives is ex-
cluded: party membership was too fluid for accurate char-
acterization.
The blockout zone is measured as two times the dis-
tance from the chamber median to the majority party me-
dian in the first dimension of DW Nominate space (Poole
and Rosenthal 2007). I focus on the first dimension because
it has consistently explained a large portion of votes in Con-
gress and because the theories being tested are built upon
one-dimensional models. Larger blockout zones provide more
opportunity for blocking and more potential for blocking elec-
torally risky extreme status quos.10
The first of two measures of the degree to which issues
are blocked is the change in the number of issues raised in
House roll call votes. Change in the total number of issues
raised in House roll call votes can be used to measure the
extent of majority blocking if the number of active issues
in American politics at time t and prior time periods is
roughly the same. Therefore, an increase in the number of
issues raised will reflect the decision of the majority party
to address a larger portion of the issues, and a decrease
in the number of issues raised will reflect more blocking,
with the attendant risks of defeat.11 The issue coding is
based on a count of the total number of specific issues con-
sidered on the floor of the House of Representatives. Keith
Poole, Howard Rosenthal, and their collaborators (Poole
and Rosenthal 2007) coded votes in Congress using 107 spe-
cific issue codes for the 1st through 107th sessions of Con-
gress.12 Issue change is measured as the ratio of the number
9. Polarization in the model is intradistrict polarization, which McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal (2009) have shown is the primary factor in shaping
overall polarization.
10. Also status quos with large random shocks are less likely to re-
main in small blockout zones.
11. Obviously this measure will be somewhat noisy. For instance, voice
votes will be missed.
12. Some examples from the beginning of the list of issues include these:
Abortion/Care of deformed newborns, Agriculture, Airlines/Airports/Airline
Industry, Alien and Sedition Laws, Amnesty (all wars), and Arms Control.
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of issues raised in the current session divided by the aver-
age number of issues raised in the previous two sessions of
Congress.13 Values greater than one indicate an increase
in the number of issues and values less than one indicate a
decrease in the number of issues.
Although it is available for fewer sessions, the number of
issues House committees blocked from reaching the floor
more precisely assesses whether issues are being blocked.
The Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2002)
codes all bills introduced in the 80th through 112th ses-
sions of Congress using a standard set of issue subcatego-
ries derived from the Policy Agendas Project. An issue is
coded as “blocked” if bills were introduced that dealt with
the issue but no bills were reported by committee to the full
chamber.14 The portion of issues reported has ranged be-
tween 51% and 72%. As one would expect, as the blockout
zone grows larger, the portion of issues considered dimin-
ishes (rp 20.51).
The final measure uses status quo location estimates
(Richman 2011) to directly evaluate the mean status quo
location and its proximity to the majority party median.
As illustrated in figure 2, majority defeat should become
more likely as the mean status quo location approaches
the party median. Although Richman’s status quo estimates
provide the most precise indication of status quo locations
relative to party preferences, estimates are available for only
a few sessions, and status quo locations are available only for
a limited number of issues. Richman (2011) calculated esti-
mates for the 103rd through 110th sessions of Congress,
which I updated to include issue locations at the end of the
111th and 112th sessions of Congress using the same meth-
odology. Richman’s measurement approach is unique in its
ability to estimate status quo locations across time for issues
that were not addressed. Other leading strategies (e.g., Peress
2013) can only estimate status quo for issues that received
floor votes.
The status quo estimation technique joins data from leg-
islator surveys conducted by Project Vote Smart with an
ideological scaling of roll call votes. Once legislators’ ideologi-
cal positions have been assessed using roll call votes, survey
responses are used to identify policy status quo locations.
The intuition behind status quo location estimation is that the
legislator with policy preferences closest to the current policy
status quo should be the legislator most reluctant to see any
change in current policy when asked in the survey. For in-
stance, legislators who want to see the capital gains tax rate
increased will be to the left of the status quo, legislators who
prefer to see it reduced will be to the right of the status quo,
while a legislator who prefers to see the current rate main-
tained has an ideal point close to the status quo.
The ideal point with the strongest preference for main-
taining the current status quo is identified by Richman (2011)
using an ordered logit model in which the dependent vari-
able is an ordinal survey response with categories for de-
creasing spending or taxes below the current level, main-
taining the current status quo, and increasing spending or
taxes above the current level. The resulting status quo es-
timates are located in a common space that includes all leg-
islators.
I use status quo location estimates to measure the mean
policy location shortly before the elections that took place
at the end of the 103rd through 112th Congresses across
the following issues: alcohol taxes, spending on the arts,
capital gains taxes, cigarette taxes, corporate taxes, defense
spending, spending on environmental cleanup and enforce-
ment, taxes on high-income earners, and foreign aid, as these
are the only issues with estimates available for most sessions.
Control variables
Midterm loss for the president’s party is coded 1 when mid-
term losses will aid the majority, zero for presidential elec-
tion years, and 21 when midterm losses will aid the mi-
nority. The variable should have a positive effect on the
majority’s electoral prospects. Presidential Coattails is coded
1 when the winner of the presidential election is of the same
party as the majority, 21 when the winner is not from the
same party as the House majority, and 0 in midterm years.
Other control variables, including macro-partisanship, pub-
lic policy mood, divided government, majority win rate, ma-
jority party unity, legislative productivity, and party polari-
zation, are examined in the online appendix.
Majority defeat
In table 1, models 1–3 examine the effects of blockout zone
size and change in the number of issues presented on the seat
share held by the majority party. Model 4 examines sessions
of Congress from the 81st through the 107th using the mea-
13. Two sessions dampen random variation from session to session while
remaining current. One-session measures and inclusion of additional sessions
yielded similar results, although the p-value for the three-session issue change
fell short of statistical significance (pp .16).
14. One possible concern is that when an issue is sure to be blocked,
the minority may have less incentive to introduce it. However, the struc-
ture of the model addresses this concern: sometimes such issues will be
brought to the floor if the majority party deems that blocking them will be
too electorally risky. Electoral position taking provides an additional in-
centive to introduce bills.
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sure of committee blocking. Model 5 examines sessions of
Congress from the 103rd through the 112th with the status
quo location measure. All analyses use AR(1) time series
models.15
The results presented in table 1 suggest that blocking can
be costly for the majority party in subsequent elections.
In all five models, the hypothesized effect of blocking is
statistically significant (p ! .05). Majority parties that block
more, have larger blockout zones, or are defending status
quo locations closer to the majority party median win fewer
seats. Although each measure of blocking has limitations,
taken together these results provide substantial support for
the notion that blocking can be electorally costly for the ma-
jority party.
The results presented in table 1 are substantively sizable.
For instance, the results presented in model 3 imply that a
one standard deviation change in the size of the majority
party blockout zone is associated with a 4.3% shift in the seat
share of the majority party (nearly 19 seats in the modern
Congress). A change from the minimum to the maximum
size of the blockout zone is associated with an 18% swing
(about 79 seats). A one standard deviation change in the
number of issues raised is associated with a 3.1% shift in the
majority seat share (nearly 14 seats in the modern House),
and a move from the minimum to the maximum change in
issues raised produces a swing of 18% (nearly 80 seats in the
modern House). Similarly, for every 1% increase in the por-
tion of issues not blocked in committee, the majority party
typically wins almost 2 additional seats. A move from the ob-
served minimum to the observed maximum is associated
with a gain of 37 seats. Finally as the mean status quo loca-
tion moves closer to the majority party median, the majority
party tends to lose more seats: a shift from the sample min-
imum tomaximumbias toward themajority party is expected
to be associated with a 16.8% swing in the post-election share
of the incumbent majority party.
15. Similar results were obtained for models 1–4 using more complex
time series models than the Prais-Winsten AR(1) including ARMA (2, 2).
The analysis of status quo locations (model 5) would not converge for
some models and should be considered less reliable in any case, given the
very small number of observations. Limiting consideration to sessions of
Congress after the imposition of Reed’s rules also does not change the
results substantially.
Table 1. Blocking and Majority Seat Share Post-Election
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Size of majority blockout zone 2.196* 2.273*
(.080) (.081)
Portion of issues reported
by committee .403*
(.191)
Increase in number of
issues voted on .119* .141*
(.048) (.047)
Status quo bias toward
majority party ideology 2.452*
(.175)
Mid-term effect .044* .031 .050* .035*
(.017) (.016) (.017) (.013)
Presidential coattails .058* .063* .056* .023*
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.013)
Constant .639** .447** .518** .305 2.037*
(.033) (.052) (.056) (.122)* (.012)
N 110 103 103 33 10
Adjusted R2 .26 .24 .32 .19 .36
Durbin-Watson 2.15 2.20 2.17 1.73 1.89
Note. Prais-Winsten AR(1) model. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ! .05 (two-tailed).
** p ! .01 (two-tailed).
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Control variables had the expected effects. Midterm loss
and presidential coattails are regular and predictable fea-
tures of US congressional elections, and these patterns are
apparent across most models. These variables were ex-
cluded from model 5 because of the extremely small N.16
Similar patterns obtain when the dependent variable is
reduced to a binary indicator of whether the majority party
lost majority status in the next election (1) or not (0). While
reducing the variability in the data in this way arguably
makes sense because the theoretical prediction concerns loss
of majority status, the uncertainty attendant on election out-
comes should lead the causal effects of majority blocking
on election outcomes to remain important even in instances
where party control does not change.
Table 2 analyzes the same independent variables but
uses a dichotomous dependent variable—whether the major-
ity party lost majority status or not. All of the blocking vari-
ables retain statistically significant effects in the equations
predicting majority party defeat in table 2. Larger majority
blockout zones were associated with a higher probability of
defeat, while reporting more issues, voting on more issues,
and less status quo bias toward the majority party were all
associated with reductions in the probability of defeat. Mod-
els 3 and 4 are linear probability time series models instead
of logit models because of problems with completely deter-
mined observations.17
Movement of extreme blockout zone status quos
The decision to unblock a status quo should be conditional
upon the degree to which it is electorally risky. As argued
above, this risk is larger for a more extreme status quo, and
smaller for a less extreme status quo, although such move-
ment need not involve an explicit party roll if packaged with
policy changes to other issues favored by party members. Us-
ing the Richman (2011) status quo and outcome estimates
described above, this section briefly analyzes the implication
that status quos in the party cartel blockout zone that are
farther from the chamber median will be more likely to be
altered.
I analyze all initial status quos meeting the criteria for
measurement quality outlined by Richman (2011) that were
located within the party cartel blockout zone, a total of
50 observations. For each such status quo (qjt), I measured
the distance between the status quo and the chamber me-
dian Fj2 qjt



. Larger distances should be associated with a
higher likelihood that policy will shift toward the median.
I measure changes toward the chamber median using the
value Fj2 qjt



2 Fj2 qjt11



. Positive values indicate a move
toward the chamber median, while negative values indi-
cate a move away from the chamber median. If blocking is
unconditional, then no status quo locations should change,
and there should be no relationship between the initial
status quo location in the blockout zone and moves toward
the chamber median. On the other hand, if (as hypothe-
sized) more extreme status quo locations pose larger elec-
toral risks, such status quo locations should experience
larger shifts toward the chamber median. I include one con-
trol variable, an indicator for Hastert’s status as speaker. The
period analyzed (104th through 112th Congresses) includes
four sessions in which Dennis Hastert was speaker. In line
with the Hastert rule, less movement of blockout zone status
quo toward the preferences of the chamber median should
be expected under Hastert’s tenure.
The results reported in table 3 are consistent with ex-
pectations. When the initial status quo location was farther
from the chamber median within the blockout zone, the
outcome location moved toward the median more (p ! .045,
two-tailed). In addition, there was significantly less move-
ment toward the median when Hastert was speaker.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that unconditional negative agenda
setting of the sort described in the party cartel model (Cox
and McCubbins 2005) and advocated by former Speaker
Dennis Hastert (Babbington 2004) can produce conditions
in which the majority party loses popular support and loses
elections. The theoretical analysis and empirical results imply
that the ability to use negative agenda power is circum-
scribed by this risk of electoral defeat. Some blocked issues
are issues on which the opposition can campaign and win.
Therefore, the opportunity for effective negative agenda con-
trol is conditional (on party polarization and the distribu-
tion of status quo locations): majority party roll rates should
sometimes be non-zero, and blocking will increase the odds
of majority party defeat.
16. With 10 observations, inclusion could produce severe overfitting of
the model. An analysis that includes both variables (available by request)
indicates a very strong and statistically significant effect for the status quo
location bias measure (Bp20.668, p ! .001). Presidential coattails also have
a significant effect ( p ! .001), but midterm loss is not statistically significant
(p p .195). Perhaps this hints that the midterm loss phenomenon reflects
shifts in status quo locations toward the president’s party. Two recent
exceptions (1998 and 2002) both occurred in years when the mean status quo
location shifted away from the president’s party.
17. For instance, in the logit version of model 4, status quo bias to-
ward the majority party predicted all observations perfectly, making it
impossible to estimate parameters precisely.
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Arguably the electoral risks of Hastert rule agenda set-
ting my model captures played out in particularly dramatic
form in 2006 as multiple sessions of Hastert’s own rule as
speaker came to a close. Republican blocking helped hand
Democrats multiple effective campaign issues. For exam-
ple, at least two of the issues that made up the Democrats
successful “Six for ’06” national agenda were ones on which
Republican leaders could probably have crafted compromises
that moved policy without even rolling the party.18 Would
“Four for ’06” have won as many votes?
Extending Cox and McCubbins’s “first commandment”
to capture the response to electoral risks leads to a “golden
rule” of party agenda setting: “Thou shalt love thy oppo-
nent’s popular issues as thy own.”An example of such “golden
rule” agenda setting was the Republican leadership’s com-
promise on the minimum wage in 1996 that bundled mini-
mum wage increases with tax cuts (Stewart 2001) to unblock
a status quo while avoiding an explicit partisan roll.
The analysis here has focused on the US House of Rep-
resentatives, as with Cox and McCubbins’s (2005) study, but
as with their study, there are significant opportunities to ex-
tend this analysis to a range of other legislatures with different
institutional structures, including the US Senate and US state
legislatures. Although almost all legislatures grant substantial
blocking power to leaders, leaders’ ability to use that power is
circumscribed by the danger that they will undermine popular
support for their party.
Table 2. Blocking and Loss of Majority Status
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Size of majority blockout zone 3.39*
(1.91)
5.13*
.(2.24)
Portion of issues reported by committee 22.64*
(.96)
Increase in number of issues voted on 22.52*
(1.31)
Status quo bias toward majority party ideology 4.48*
(.92)
Mid-term effect 21.99*
(.64)
22.20*
(.70)
2.23*
(.08)
Presidential coattails 21.76*
(.59)
21.70*
(.59)
2.08
(.08)
Constant 23.33
(.95)
21.40
(1.49)
1.84*
(.61)
2.34*
(.05)
N 111 104 33 10
Pseudo R2 .25 .30 .36 .68
Note. Logit models, except for models 3 and 4, which are Prais-Winstein AR(1). Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ! .05 (one-tailed).
18. A minimum wage increase was one component of the Democrats’
“Six for ’06” platform. Almost half of the Republican delegation in the
House backed a minimum wage increase in January 2007. Similarly,
Hastert blocked passage of an intelligence reform bill in 2004 because it
lacked majority support within the majority party (Babington 2004), yet in
2007 most Republicans backed an intelligence bill drafted by Democratic-
majority committees.
Table 3. Do Extreme Blocked Status Quos Shift More toward
the Median?
Policy Outcome
Movement toward
House Median
Initial status quo distance from median 1.29
(.63)*
Hastert speaker (indicator) 2.08
(.04)*
Constant 2.24
(.11)
N 50
Adjusted R2 .08
Note. OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ! .05 (one-tailed).
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